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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH
V. J. LUND, WILLARD E. KNIBBEE,
ERNIE A. POULSEN and EVAN W.
HANSEN, representing a Class of Persons
residing and owning real property in Cottonwood Heights, Salt Lake County, Utah,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

COTTONWOOD MEADOWS COMPANY, a
partnership consisting of W. ALLEN PELTON, and Others unknown, also SALT
LAKE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision
of the State of Utah, and PERSYL RICHARDSON, Director of the Salt Lake Countty Building and Zoning Inspection Dept.,
Defendants-Respondents.

10015

OF RESPONDENTS
SALTLAKECOUNTYAND
PERSYL RICHARDSON

BRIE~.,

STATE~IENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

These respondents adopt appellants' Statement of
the Nature of the Case.

DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
These respondents adopt appellants' Disposition
of the Lower Court.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
These respondents are seeking affirmance of the
judgment granted by the Third District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, lJtah, awarding summary judgment in favor of all Defendants-Respondents.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
These respondents adopt the Statement of Material
Facts previously set forth by respondent Cottonwood
Meadows Company.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANTS FAILED
TO EXHAUST THEIR A.DMINISTRATIVE
REMEDY.
The building permit in question was issued and
delivered to respondent Cottonwood Meadows Company on September 10, 1962. This lawsuit was commenced in the District Court on February 21, 1963,
some five months and eleven days following issuance
of the building permit. No appeal to the Salt Lake
County Board of Adjustment or any other administrative board was filed at any time by any of the appellants.
Appellants, in their argument under Point I of
their brief, rely strongly on four arguments to "excuse"
them from following administrative review procedure
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established by and pursuant to the Statutes of the State
of l'tah:
I. ..\ ppeal to the Salt Lake County Board of Ad-

justment would ha Ye been fruitless for the reason that
said Board lacked the "power" to provide any relief;
:!. Bringing of the ad1ninistrative review was permissive only and not mandatory;
:L The Statutes provide appellants with alternate
rcme{lits. either administrative or judicial; and,

4. A.ppellants are not "persons aggrieved" as in-

tended by the Statutes.
\ \' ith each of these contentions, these respondents
take issue.
1. The pertinent portions of 17-27-16 U.C.A. 1953
han· been set forth and variously emphasized in briefs
of appellants and the other respondent. Nothing would
he gained by duplicating them at this time. Accordingly,
these respondents adopt both the content and the emphasis which has been added by both briefs. However,
these respondents neither adopt nor agree with the contention set forth on page 6 of appellants' brief that
review in this case would have been fruitless because
the adn1inistratiYe body would be powerless to afford
relief."
The uniform Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake
County (Title 8, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, Utah, 1953) devotes all of Chapter 5 to the
establishment, duties and powers of the Board of Adjustment and proYides, in part:

3
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"8-5-2. DUTIES AND

POWERS OF

BOARD.
" (a) It shall be the duty of such Board to hear
all appeals taken by any person aggrieved or by
any officer, department, board or bureau of the
County affected by any decision of the officer in
charge of the administration of this Title ...
''(b) In addition to any other powers given by
State Law or County Ordinance, the Board,
after proper notice and public hearing, shall have
the following powers:
" ... ( 3) Interpretation.

"(a) The Board may interpret the Zoning
Map and the Zoning Ordinance.
"(b) The Board may hear and decide appeals
where it is alleged by the appellant that there
is error in any order, requirement, decision or
refusal made in the enforcement of this Ordinance.''
At first blush, the contention of appellants that the
Board of Adjustment lacked "power" to afford them
any relief would appear absurd. On a closer examination, this contention is bared of all semblance of logic.
Certainly the act of respondent Persyl Richardson
in issuing the building permit in question was a "decision
of the officer in charge of the administration of this
Title" for respondent Richardson is that officer as designated by the ordinance itself. Certainly the Board had
the "power" to interpret the Zoning Map and the Zoning Ordinance, and that is all that was in question. The
question was not, as appellants would attempt to stress
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un page ti of their brief, whether or not an ordinance
"is arbitrary or unreasonable or ... invalid."

i'-ml, certainly appellants are alleging that there
was "error in (an) order, require1nent, decision or
rd'usal in the enforcement of this Ordinance." The cmnplaint in this lawsuit makes that allegation clear and
part of the relief sought in the trial court was to have
the action of respondent Richardson in issuing the building perrnit declared in error, void, and invalid.
This "excuse" on the part of appellants for not
exhausting their administrative remedies lack substantiation.
Appellants next dwell, on page 7 of their brief,
on what they claim is the "permissive" nature of the
words used in Sec. 17-27-16.
:2.

This point, these respondents feel, is fairly and
adequately covered in the brief filed on behalf of respondent Cottonwood Meadows Cmnpany and these respondents, accordingly, adopt the arguments therein contained. In addition, it is of interest that appellants are
before the Supreme Court by virtue of the authority of
Rule 73 (a) U.R.C.P.
That rule states, as does Sec. 17-27-16, that an
appeal "may" be taken. These respondents submit that
a fair interpretation of Rule 73 (a) is that in the event
an appeal is taken then it l\iUST be taken in the following 1nanner and within the following time.
5
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By using the permissive "may" in Rule 73 (a)
neither the Legislature nor the Supreme Court have
provided any means by which an unsuccessful litigant
can receive review other than by following the procedure
of that Rule.
Both appellants and respondent Cottonwood Meadows Company have cited, with obvious favor, the Utah
case of Provo City v. Claudin, 73 P2d 570. These respondents, therefore, add a lustre of unanimity to one portion
of this litigation by likewise relying on this earlier pronouncement by this Honorable Court.
These respondents submit that the Utah Supreme
Court in the Claudin case has laid to rest the question
of whether or not administrative remedies must be exhausted in zoning cases. At page 575, the Court said:
''The court need not consider such matters in
issue until they have been tried administratively,
especially where there are channels from administrative rulings to the courts. . . ."
These respondents vigorously question that the
Claudin case is a source for the pronouncement which
appellants contend for it on pages 6 and 7 of their brief.
The Claudin case was interpreting 15-8-89 to 15-8-107
Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 and particularly Section
15-8-98, which stated:
"Appeals to the board of adjustment may be
taken by any person aggrieved. . . ."
This language is identical to that of the present
Section 17-27-16. Interpreting the language of Section

6
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t.J-8-m~

Hc' ised Statutes of Utah 1933, this Court annuun<.·ed that adtuinistrative remedies must be exhausted .
. \ppdlanls have subtnitted nothing to indicate that the
Clnudin decision should be overruled.
The only difficulty this Court had with exhaustion
of administrative remedies in the Claudin case was the
fnct that the relief sought was to have an ordinance
declared "arbitrary and unreasonable" and, hence, in
violation of Constitutional rights. This Court, and
rightly so, indicated that only the judiciary and not the
administrative arm of government can pass upon the
arbitrariness and unreasonableness and, hence, the Constitutionality of a law.
:3 • .Appellants

would contend that Sections 17-27-16
and 17-27-23 provide them with "alternative" remedies
either to proceed administratively or judicially. In doing
so. appellants would appear to be attempting to impart
to these sections an inconsistency under any other interpretation. These respondents take issue with this contention .
....-\.clear and fair interpretation of these two sections
Is tim t the administrative remedies first must be exhausted and then, if the aggrieved party desires to go
further, injunction may be sought in addition to mere
review of the action of the Board of Adjustment.
Decisions of administrative board of appeal historically are subject to review by the courts through
certiorari. Certiorari permits review only of errors of law

7
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committed by the administrative tribunal and solely
upon the record before that administrative tribunal. Lee
v. Board of Adjustment, 226 NC 107, 37 SE2d 128;
Inzerelli v. Pitney, 30 NYS 2d 129. This latter case
adds to this rule that, in the absence of express statutory
authority for sorr1e other relief of procedure on appeal,
certiorari is exclusive.
The Utah Legislature obviously did not think that
certiorari was sufficient. In enacting Section 17-27-23
they have permitted injunction to issue from a court of
competent jurisdiction if all of the other requirements
of the various statutes have been met.
A clear and fair interpretation of Section 17-27-16
and 17-27-23 is that appellants had the right to appeal
to the Board of Adjustment and, if still dissatisfied,
could seek further review in the Courts, which review
would amount to a trial de novo and could include
issuance of an injunction, if such proved to be an a ppropriate remedy.
These Sections provided appellants with an "alternative" remedy after they had exhausted their administrative remedies but not an "alternative" remedy to
exhaustion of their administrative remedies.
4. Appellants raise, for the first time on appeal,
the rather novel question that they are not "persons
aggrieved." Their argument would appear to make some
distinction between "persons aggrieved" and "persons
materially affected." For, if they are not aggrieved then
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considerable time of both Courts and counsel has been
expended for naught.
These respondents submit that, while Section
17-:.!7·16 does not define "person aggrieved" Section 17:.!7 -~:> includes appellants within a class of persons who

ure entitled to take their grievance beyond the Board of
Adjustment and into the Courts and, therefore, designates appellants as a class of "persons aggrieved."
~lany courts have faced the problem of who is an
aggrieved person in the matter of zoning decisions.

One such case is People ex rel. Broadway Co. v.
\\'alsh, 196 NYS 672, affirmed in 203 App Div 468,
wherein the New York Court held:
"The relator, which was a taxpayer in the city
of New York is a person aggrieved within the
1neaning of subdivision 2 of Section 719 of the
Greater New York charter providing that an
appeal may be taken by any person aggrieved
from an order, requirement, decision or determination made by the superintendent of buildings.
"The relator having failed to exhaust its remedy by appeal to the board of appeals, is not
in a position to apply to the court for relief by
way of mandamus to compel the superintendent
of buildings to cancel and revoke the permit, and
its n1otion for a final order was properly denied."
\T ariously, other courts have held the following

classes of persons to be what is denominated in Utah
statutes as a "person aggrieved":

9
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A person who owned improved real property in the
same section of the City (of Schenectady) , see Rice v.
Van Vranker, 232 NYS 506,225 App Div 179, affirmed
in 255 NY 541, 170 NE 126; a lessee, see Ralston
Purina Company v. Zoning Board, 64 RI 197, 12 A2d
219; any landowner or resident within the city, adversely
affected, see Kamerman v. Leroy, 133 Conn 232,50 A2d
175; mere taxpayers of the city (of Baltimore) even
though they did not live in the neighborhood involved
and no near neighbors objected, see Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. Byrd, 191 Md 632, 62 At12d
588.

Certainly the courts have expanded the definition
of "person aggrieved" beyond that advanced by appellants in quoting from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Where legislative guidelines have been provided, as Utah
has done in enacting Section 17-27-23 to afford relief
for any person owning property in the same zoned district those guidelines should not be disregarded in interpreting and defining "person aggrieved" as used in
Section 17-27-16.
Short "appeal periods" are essential in acts of zoning boards and administrators, just as they are in
judicial review of judgments and final orders of an
inferior tribunal. A judgment or final order of a court
must have stability- an aura of definiteness- if judicial decrees are to have integrity upon which those
affected thereby may exhibit reliance.
So must it be with acts and decisions of zoning
boards and administrators.

10
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. \ zoning board or administrator makes a decision,
pnforn1s an act. That act always affects valuable rights

itt rl'al property. Everyone is not always pleased by the
dec: is ion; some are aggrieved. However, in each instance
someone is going to gamble a valuable real property
right on that decision or act. In order that those whose
rights are affected by the decision or act may rely upon
the finality, stability and integrity of that decision or
act appeal rights must be stilled early.
Hence, the Legislature of the State of Utah has
seen fit to provide for administrative review through
boards of adjustment and permitted each county of the
State to provide the time within which such review must
be sought by appeal, properly entrusting to the boards
of county commissioners of the various counties the
responsibility of determining what best suits the general
welfare of their particular citizens.
Acting under this authority and responsibility, Salt
Lake County has provided that such an appeal must be
taken within 90 days. The reasonableness of that short
appeal period has not been questioned by appellants.
Hence, we can but assume that they agree that it is a
reasonable length of time.
James :\Ietzenbaum, in his learned, three-volume
work on zoning ( Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning)
devotes Chapter IX-e to problems of exhaustion of administrative remedies. At Chapter IX-e- (2) the author
say~. at Yolwne 1. page 712:
11
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"The general rule is that a complainant attacking the constitutionality or unreasonableness of
specific provisions of a zoning ordinance as it
applies to a particular property, must exhaust
the available administrative remedies before resorting to court.
"This rule applies whether such attacking
actions are brought by way of lVIandamus
or by Injunction or by Declaratory Judgment
proceedings. It has been upheld in most states
and by the Federal courts.
"This rule is supported not only by the preponderance of court decisions but, also, by logic
and reason:
"In each state, there are many thousands of
buildings and many thousands of parcels of land.
"If each plaintiff were permitted to engage
the courts with proceedings attacking the constitutionality or the unconstitutional-unreasonableness of each zoning ordinance as it applies to such
complainant's own property, without first seeking relief by the available administrative remedies, would not the courts of every state be
clogged with such actions virtually to the exclusion of other matters?
"Would there not be so great a flood of such
proceedings as to overwhelm the courts?"
Again, at Volume 1, page 717, the author says:
"This rule applies in 'injunction' and 'declaratory' actions.
"Not only reason but the array of court pronouncements in Injunction and Declaratory
1~
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J udg1nent proceedings also testify to this broadly
imbedded rule, and that, too, where constitutionality of such specific provisions was in issue."
The author then virtually spans the nation with
rtported cases from California to New York, including
therein the Claudin case heretofore cited.

CONCLUSION
.Appellants have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies which were provided them both by statute anrl
by ordinance. They have slept on their rights. They
should not now be heard to complain of the acts of others
who diligently pursued their rights and responsibilities.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
In no event should the relief asked by appellants
be granted and sunuuary judgment be entered in their
favor. These respondents find nothing in the record nor
in appellants' brief to indicate that the refusal of the
trial judge to grant summary judgment in favor of
appellants was raised by this appeal.
If the judgment of the trial court is to be reversed,
which we respectfully submit it should not, this matter
should be remanded for determination of all factual
questions and a trial on the merits.

13
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Respectfully submitted,
OLLIE McCULLOCH
Chief Deputy
Salt Lake County Attorney
513 City-County Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondents
Salt Lake County and
Persyl Richardson
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